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The basic reproductive number — R0 — is one of the most common and most commonly misapplied numbers
in public health. Nevertheless, estimating R0 for every transmissible pathogen, emerging or endemic, remains a
priority for epidemiologists the world over. Although often used to compare outbreaks and forecast pandemic
risk, this single number belies the complexity that two different pathogens can exhibit, even when they have
the same R0. Here, we show how predicting outbreak size requires both an estimate of R0 and an estimate
of the heterogeneity in the number of secondary infections. To facilitate rapid determination of outbreak risk,
we propose a reformulation of a classic result from random network theory that relies on contact tracing data
to simultaneously determine the first moment (R0) and the higher moments (representing the heterogeneity)
in the distribution of secondary infections. Further, we show how this framework is robust in the face of the
typically limited amount of data for emerging pathogens. Lastly, we demonstrate that without data on the
heterogeneity in secondary infections for emerging pathogens like 2019-nCoV, the uncertainty in outbreak size
ranges dramatically, in the case of 2019-nCoV from 5-40% of susceptible individuals. Taken together, our work
highlights the critical need for contact tracing during emerging infectious disease outbreaks and the need to look
beyond R0 when predicting epidemic size.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1918, individuals infected with influenza typically
passed on the virus to between 1 and 2 of their social con-
tacts [1]. The same was true for those infected with Ebola
virus during the 2014 outbreak in West Africa [2, 3]. Nev-
ertheless, Ebola virus disease infected a tenth of one percent
of the number of individuals believed to have been infected
by the 1918 Influenza virus [4, 5]. While improvements in
healthcare and public health measures, as well as changes in
human behavior, partially explain the massive discrepancy be-
tween Ebola virus disease in 2014 and influenza in 1918 [6],
there is another critical difference between these two diseases:
heterogeneity in the number secondary cases resulting from a
single infected individual. Here, we demonstrate analytically
that quantifying the variability in the number of secondary in-
fections via contact tracing is critically important for quantify-
ing the transmission risk of novel pathogens and further show
how a lack of publicly available contact tracing data on cases
of novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV) prevents the global public
health community from determining the true pandemic risk of
this novel virus.
The basic reproduction number of an epidemic, R0, is the
expected number of secondary cases [7], or infections, pro-
duced by a primary case over the course of their infectious pe-
riod in a completely susceptible population [8]. It is a simple
metric that is commonly used to describe the transmissibilty
of emerging and endemic pathogens [9]. If R0 = 2, one case
turns to two, on average, and two turn to four as the epidemic
grows. And if R0 < 1, the epidemic will die out. However, we
are seldom concerned with epidemics that emerge and quickly
die out. To observe an epidemic requires some level of sus-
tained transmission, i.e., R0 > 1. Almost 100 years ago, pi-
oneering work from Kermack and McKendrick [10–12] first
demonstrated how to estimate the final size of an epidemic for
a pathogen with R0 > 1. Specifically, they consider a scenario
such that:
1. the disease results in complete immunity or death,
2. all individuals are equally susceptible,
3. the disease is transmitted in a closed population,
4. contacts occur according to the law of mass-action,
5. and the population is large enough to justify a determin-
istic analysis.
Under these assumptions, Kermack and McKendrick show
that an epidemic with a given R0 will infect a fixed fraction
R(∞) of the susceptible population by solving
R(∞) = − 1
R0
ln [1 − R(∞)] . (1)
This solution describes a final outbreak size equal to 0 when
R0 ≤ 1 and increasing as 1 − exp(−R0) when R0 > 1. There-
fore, a larger R0 leads to a larger outbreak which infects the
entire population in the limit R0 → ∞. This direct relation-
ship between R0 and the final epidemic size is at the core of
the conventional wisdom that a larger R0 will cause a larger
outbreak and small variations in R0 can lead to vastly differ-
ent total case counts. Unfortunately, the equation relating R0
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2to final outbreak size from Kermack and McKendrick is only
valid when all the above assumptions hold, which in practice
is rarely the case. In fact, seemingly trivial violations of the
above assumptions can lead to vastly different outbreak sizes
even when R0 is held constant.
As a result, relying on R0 alone is often misleading when
comparing different pathogens or outbreaks of the same
pathogen in different settings [13–15]. This is especially criti-
cal considering that most outbreaks are not shaped by the “av-
erage” individuals but rather by a minority of superspread-
ing events [13, 16]. For example, public health officials are
currently trying determine whether 2019-nCoV can be con-
tained or whether it will cause a pandemic [17]. Despite nu-
merous estimates of 2019-nCoV’s R0 (ranging from 1.5 to
just under 4 [18–23]), as we discussed above in the compari-
son of Ebola virus disease and 1918 influenza, whether—like
SARS—2019-nCoV can be contained or—like 2009 H1N1—
2019-nCoV will cause a pandemic depends largely on the het-
erogeneity in the number of secondary infections. Indeed, re-
cent work modeling the effectiveness of contact tracing and
isolation on preventing 2019-nCoV concluded that the prob-
ability of containing the outbreak was significantly lower if
2019-nCoV heterogeneity in secondary infections was low,
like influenza, as compared to higher, like SARS [24]. To
more fully quantify how heterogeneity in the number of sec-
ondary infections affects outbreak size, we turn towards net-
work epidemiology and derive an equation for the total num-
ber of infected individuals using all moments of the distribu-
tion of secondary infections.
II. ANALYSIS FROM NETWORK THEORY
Random network theory allows us to relax some of assump-
tions made by Kermack and McKendrick, mainly to account
for heterogeneity and stochasticity in the number of secondary
infections caused by a given individual.
We first follow the analysis of Ref. [25] and define G0(x) as
the probability generating function (PGF) of the degree distri-
bution {pk} (number of contacts), i.e.
G0(x) =
∞∑
k=0
pkxk . (2)
When following a random edge, we define the excess degree
as the number of other edges around that node. Because an
edge is k times more likely to reach a node of degree k than a
node of degree 1, the excess degree distribution is generated
by
G1(x) =
1
〈k〉
∞∑
k=1
kpkxk−1 =
G′0(x)
G′0(1)
(3)
where 〈k〉 is the average degree and acts as a normalisation
constant, and G′0(x) denotes the derivative of G0(x) with re-
spect to x.
We now assume that the network in question is the network
of all edges that would transmit a disease if given the chance.
Consequently, G1(x) generates the number of secondary in-
fections that individual nodes would cause if infected. And,
if we infect a random node as the patient zero, its entire con-
nected component (a maximal subset of nodes between which
paths exists between all pairs of nodes) will be infected. To
calculate the largest possible epidemic, we thus look for the
size of the giant connected component (GCC).
To calculate the size of the GCC, we first look for the prob-
ability u that following a random edge leads to a node not part
of the GCC. For that node to not be part of the GCC, all of
its excess edges must also not lead to the GCC. This simple
observation leads to the self-consistent equation
u =
1
〈k〉
∞∑
k=1
kpkuk−1 = G1(u) . (4)
The size of the GCC is a fraction of the full population N that
we will denote R(∞) because it corresponds to the potential,
macroscopic, outbreak size. Noting that a node of degree k is
not in the GCC with probability uk, R(∞) can be written as
R(∞) = 1 −G0(u) (5)
because it contains all nodes except those with no edges lead-
ing to the GCC. This solution is exact in the limit of large
population size.
III. REINTERPRETATION AND RESULTS
The network approach naturally accounts for heterogeneity,
meaning that some individuals will cause more infections than
others. The network approach also accounts for stochasticity
explicitly: Even with R0 > 1, there is a probability 1 − R(∞)
that patient zero lies outside of the giant outbreak and there-
fore only leads to a small outbreak that does not invade the
population.
However, the analysis in terms of PGFs is obviously more
involved than simply assuming mass-action mixing and solv-
ing Eq. (1). In fact, the PGF G0(x) requires a full distribution
of secondary cases per primary case, which will in practice
involve a polynomial of high order.
To clarify and potentially simplify the approach, we pro-
pose to reformulate the classic network model in terms of
the cumulant generating function (CGF) of secondary cases.
The CGF K(y) of a random variable X can be written as
K(y) =
∑
κnyn/n! where κn are the cumulants of the distri-
bution of secondary infections. These are useful because the
cumulants are easier to interpret, i.e., κ1 is simply the average
number of secondary cases R0, κ2 is the underlying variance,
κ3 is related to the skewness and κ4 to the kurtosis of the full
distribution. By definition, a PGF G(x) of a random variable
is linked to K(y) through G(x) = exp [K (ln x)]. Therefore, we
can replace the PGF G1(x) for the distribution of secondary
infections by a function in terms of the cumulants of that dis-
tribution.
3FIG. 1. Illustration of the absence of a direct relationship between R0
and the final outbreak size, R(∞), using three different distributions
for the number of secondary infections per infected individual. All
three distributions are negative binomials [13] with distinct average,
R0, and variance, σ2. R(∞) is computed by solving Eqs. (4) and (5).
A. Analysis of cumulants and derivation of
Kermack-McKendrick
Using the cumulants κn, we can re-write G1(x) as
GC1 (x) = exp
 ∞∑
n=1
1
n!
κn (ln x)n
 = G1(x) (6)
which is obviously not as practical as a simple polynomial
when solving for u = GC1 (u). However, in some cases, cu-
mulants can have significant advantage over the polynomial
representation. For instance, the cumulants of a sum of in-
dependent random variables are simply the sum of the cumu-
lants — convenient when dealing with diseases with multiple
modes of transmission.
We can quickly derive Kermack and McKendrick’s result
from the previous generating function since their solution in-
volves a well-mixed population, which is equivalent to a Pois-
son distribution of secondary infections in our framework.
GC1 (x) is convenient for a Poisson distribution because its cu-
mulants κn = R0 ∀n. Moreover, since G0(x) = G1(x) in the
Poisson case, we know that the final proportion of susceptible
individuals is directly given by u = GC1 (u), or
u = exp
 ∞∑
n=1
1
n!
R0 (ln u)n
 = exp [R0 (u − 1)] .
↪→ R(∞) = 1 − exp [R0 (u − 1)] . (7)
Taking the logarithm of the exponential term from this last
equation yields Kermack and McKendrick’s formula.
For more general distributions, it is useful to rewrite Eq. (6)
as
GC1 (x) = exp
 ∞∑
n=1
1
n!
κn (ln x)n
 (8)
= exp
[
R0| ln x| − 12σ
2| ln x|2 + 1
6
κ3| ln x|3 − 124κ4| ln x|
4 . . .
]
The solution to u = GC1 (u) gives the probability that every
infection caused by patient zero fails to generate an epidemic.
Importantly, Eq. (8) has an alternating nature because ln x is
negative for x < 1 such that its n-th power is positive when n
is even and negative when n is odd.
This observation, that the moments of Eq. (8) alternate,
can be interpreted as follows. A disease needs a high aver-
age number of secondary infections (high κ1 = R0) to spread,
but given that average, a disease with small variance in sec-
ondary infections will spread much more reliably and be less
likely to stochastically die out (see Fig. 1). Given a variance, a
disease with high skewness (i.e., with positive deviation con-
tributing to most of the variance) will be more stable than a
disease with negative skewness (i.e. with most deviations be-
ing towards small secondary infections). Given a skewness,
a disease will be more stable if it has frequent small positive
deviations rather than infrequent large deviations — hence a
smaller kurtosis — as stochastic die out could easily occur
before any of those large infrequent deviations occur.
Clearly, our re-interpretation already highlights a striking
result: Higher moments of the distribution of secondary cases
can lead a disease with a lower R0 to more easily invade a pop-
ulation and to reach a larger final outbreak size than a disease
with a higher R0. We can investigate this conclusion further
using a simple example of normally distributed secondary in-
fections.
B. Normal distributions and the impact of variance
A second useful application of the cumulants formulation
involves diseases with a large reproductive number R0 whose
distribution of secondary infections can be convincingly mod-
eled by a normal distribution. The raw moments of a normal
distribution are quite complicated, but the cumulants are sim-
ple: κ1 is equal to the mean R0, κ2 is equal to the variance σ2,
and all other cumulants are 0. We can thus write
GC1 (x) = exp
[
R0 ln x +
1
2
σ2 (ln x)2
]
= xR0+
σ2
2 ln x (9)
and solving for u = GC1 (u) yields
u = exp
[
− 2
σ2
(R0 − 1)
]
. (10)
This equation can then be used for direct comparison of the
probability of invasion of two different diseases with normal
distributions of secondary infections. Given a transmission
event from patient zero to a susceptible individual, disease B
will be more likely to invade the population than disease A if
σ2B
σ2A
<
R0,A − 1
R0,B − 1 . (11)
For example, a disease with half the basic reproductive num-
ber of another will still be more likely to invade a population
and lead to a larger outbreak if its variance is only slightly less
than half the variance of the other disease.
4FIG. 2. Final size of outbreaks with different R0 and distributions
of secondary cases. We use a negative binomial distribution of sec-
ondary cases and scan realistic range of parameters. Most impor-
tantly, the range of parameters corresponding to the current outbreak
of 2019-nCoV is highlighted by a red box. The range of potential R0
comes from a 95% confidence interval using a early data and a classic
deterministic models [18, 19]. The range of dispersion parameter k
comes from analogy with severe acute respiratory syndrome [13, 24].
Most importantly, with fixed average, the dispersion parameter is in-
versely proportional to the variance of the underlying distribution of
second cases.
IV. DISCUSSION
From re-emerging pathogens like yellow fever and measles
to emerging threats like MERS-CoV and Ebola, the World
Health Organization monitored 119 different infectious dis-
ease outbreaks in 2019 alone [26]. For each of these out-
breaks, predicting both the epidemic potential and the most
likely number of cases is critically important for responding
efficiently and effectively. This need for rapid situation aware-
ness is why R0 is so widely used in public health. However,
our main analysis, and Eq. (11) in particular, show that not
only is R0 insufficient in fully determining the final size of
an outbreak, but having a larger outbreak with a lower R0 is
relatively easy considering the randomness associated with
most transmission events and the heterogeneity of physical
contacts. To address the need for rapid quantification of risk,
while acknowledging the shortcomings of R0, we use network
science methods to derive both the probability of an epidemic
and its final size.
However, these results are not without important caveats.
Specifically, we must remember that distributions of sec-
ondary cases, just like R0 itself, are just as much a product
of a pathogen as of the population in which it spreads. For
example, aspects of the social contact network [27], metapop-
ulation structure [28, 29], mobility [30, 31], adaptive behav-
ior [32, 33], higher-order contact structure [34, 35], and even
other pathogens [36, 37], all interact to cause complex pat-
terns of disease emergence, spread, and persistence. There-
fore, great care must be taken when using any of these tools to
compare outbreaks or to inform current events with past data.
Three types of data could potentially be used in real time
to improve predictions by considering secondary case hetero-
geneity. First, contact tracing data whose objective is to iden-
tify people who may have come into contact with an infec-
tious individual. While mostly a preventive measure to iden-
tify cases before complications, it directly informs us about
potential secondary cases caused by a single individual, and
therefore provides us with an estimate for G1(x). Both for
generating accurate predictions of epidemic risk and control-
ling the outbreak, it is vital to begin contact tracing before nu-
merous transmission chains become widely distributed across
space [38, 39]
Second, viral genome sequences provide information on
both the timing of the outbreak [40–42] and structure of sec-
ondary cases [43–45]. For example, methods exist to recon-
struct transmission trees for sampled sequences using sim-
ple mutational models to construct a likelihood for a spe-
cific transmission tree [46, 47] and translate coalescent rates
into key epidemiological parameters [48–50]. Despite the po-
tential for genome sequencing to revolutionize outbreak re-
sponse, the global public health community still struggles to
coordinate data sharing across international borders, between
academic researchers, and with private companies [51–53].
Third, and most often the first available real time infor-
mation on novel pathogens, are data related to similar past
outbreaks. For example, in Fig. 2 we make a range of pre-
dictions for the final size of 2019-nCoV in Wuhan based on
R0 estimates from early cases [18, 19] and for the underly-
ing distribution of secondary cases by analogy with the severe
acute respiratory syndrome in similar population [13]. Based
on this uncertainty, we obtain a range of final outbreak size
(given as a fraction of the total susceptible population) be-
tween 5% and 40%. Critically, this large range stems from
uncertainty in the heterogeneity of secondary infections. If
the heterogeneity is large, sustained transmission is mostly
maintained by so-called “super-spreading” events, then the
outbreak is both more likely to end stochastically, less likely
to spread extensively, as well as easier to manage with contact
tracing, screening and infection control [24]. With less het-
erogeneity, the outbreak almost certainly cannot be contained
and we must prepare for a pandemic of 2019-nCoV [54, 55].
Clearly, we are in dire need of contact tracing data and/or
high-resolution pathogen genome surveillance for this out-
break.
In conclusion, we reiterate that when accounting for the full
distribution of secondary cases caused by an infected individ-
ual, there is no direct relationship between R0 and the size
of an outbreak. We also stress that both R0 and the full sec-
ondary case distribution are not properties of the disease itself,
but instead set by properties of the pathogen, the host popu-
lation and the context of the outbreak. Nevertheless, we pro-
vide a straightforward methodology for translating estimates
of transmission heterogeneity into epidemic forecasts. Alto-
gether, predicting outbreak size based on early data is an in-
credibly complex challenge but one that is increasingly within
reach due to new mathematical analyses and faster communi-
cation of public health data.
5[1] M. Biggerstaff, S. Cauchemez, C. Reed, M. Gambhir, and
L. Finelli, “Estimates of the reproduction number for seasonal,
pandemic, and zoonotic influenza: a systematic review of the
literature,” BMC Infect. Dis. 14, 480 (2014).
[2] WHO Ebola Response Team, “Ebola Virus Disease in West
Africa — The First 9 Months of the Epidemic and Forward Pro-
jections,” N. Engl. J. Med. 371, 1481–1495 (2014).
[3] C. L. Althaus, “Estimating the Reproduction Number
of Ebola Virus (EBOV) During the 2014 Outbreak
in West Africa,” PLOS Curr. (2014), 10.1371/cur-
rents.outbreaks.91afb5e0f279e7f29e7056095255b288.
[4] C. E. Mills, J. M. Robins, and M. Lipsitch, “Transmissibility
of 1918 pandemic influenza,” Nature 432, 904–906 (2004).
[5] J. Kaner and S. Schaack, “Understanding Ebola: the 2014 epi-
demic,” Global. Health 12, 53 (2016).
[6] M. C. J. Bootsma and N. M. Ferguson, “The effect of public
health measures on the 1918 influenza pandemic in U.S. cities,”
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 104, 7588–7593 (2007).
[7] A technical but important caveat: We use the word “case” in
a generic sense to represent any infection, even if too mild to
meet the clinical case definition.
[8] O. Diekmann, J. A. J. Metz, and J. A. P. Heesterbeek, “The
legacy of Kermack and McKendrick,” in Epidemic Model. Their
Struct. Relat. to Data, edited by D. Mollison (Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1995) pp. 95–115.
[9] K. Sheikh, D. Watkins, J. Wu, and M. Gro¨ndahl, “How Bad
Will the Coronavirus Outbreak Get? Here Are 6 Key Factors,”
The New York Times (2020).
[10] W. O. Kermack and A. G. McKendrick, “A Contribution to the
Mathematical Theory of Epidemics,” Proc. R. Soc. A 115, 700–
721 (1927).
[11] W. O. Kermack and A. G. McKendrick, “Contributions to the
Mathematical Theory of Epidemics. II. The Problem of En-
demicity,” Proc. R. Soc. A 138, 55–83 (1932).
[12] W. O. Kermack and A. G. McKendrick, “Contributions to the
Mathematical Theory of Epidemics. III. Further Studies of the
Problem of Endemicity,” Proc. R. Soc. A 141, 94–122 (1933).
[13] J. O. Lloyd-Smith, S. J. Schreiber, P. E. Kopp, and W. M. Getz,
“Superspreading and the effect of individual variation on dis-
ease emergence,” Nature 438, 355–359 (2005).
[14] S. Bansal, B. T. Grenfell, and L. A. Meyers, “When individual
behaviour matters: homogeneous and network models in epi-
demiology,” J. R. Soc. Interface 4, 879–891 (2007).
[15] Z. Vizi, I. Z. Kiss, J. C. Miller, and G. Ro¨st, “A monotonic
relationship between the variability of the infectious period
and final size in pairwise epidemic modelling,” arXiv (2017),
arXiv:1712.06026.
[16] L. A. Meyers, B. Pourbohloul, M. E. J. Newman, D. M.
Skowronski, and R. C. Brunham, “Network theory and SARS:
Predicting outbreak diversity.” J. Theor. Biol. 232, 71–81
(2005).
[17] J. T. Wu, K. Leung, and G. M. Leung, “Nowcasting and fore-
casting the potential domestic and international spread of the
2019-nCoV outbreak originating in Wuhan, China: a modelling
study,” Lancet (2020), 10.1016/S0140-6736(20)30260-9.
[18] Q. Li, X. Guan, P. Wu, X. Wang, L. Zhou, Y. Tong, R. Ren,
K. S. M. Leung, E. H. Y. Lau, J. Y. Wong, X. Xing, N. Xi-
ang, Y. Wu, C. Li, Q. Chen, D. Li, T. Liu, J. Zhao, M. Liu,
W. Tu, C. Chen, L. Jin, R. Yang, Q. Wang, S. Zhou, R. Wang,
H. Liu, Y. Luo, Y. Liu, G. Shao, H. Li, Z. Tao, Y. Yang, Z. Deng,
B. Liu, Z. Ma, Y. Zhang, G. Shi, T. T. Y. Lam, J. T. Wu, G. F.
Gao, B. J. Cowling, B. Yang, G. M. Leung, and Z. Feng,
“Early Transmission Dynamics in Wuhan, China, of Novel
Coronavirus–Infected Pneumonia,” N. Engl. J. Med. (2020),
10.1056/NEJMoa2001316.
[19] J. M. Read, J. R. E. Bridgen, D. A. T. Cummings, A. Ho,
and C. P. Jewell, “Novel coronavirus 2019-nCoV: early estima-
tion of epidemiological parameters and epidemic predictions,”
medRxiv (2020), 10.1101/2020.01.23.20018549.
[20] T. Liu, J. Hu, M. Kang, L. Lin, H. Zhong, J. Xiao, G. He,
T. Song, Q. Huang, Z. Rong, A. Deng, W. Zeng, X. Tan,
S. Zeng, Z. Zhu, J. Li, D. Wan, J. Lu, H. Deng, J. He, and
W. Ma, “Transmission dynamics of 2019 novel coronavirus
(2019-nCoV),” bioRxiv (2020), 10.1101/2020.01.25.919787.
[21] C. Huang, Y. Wang, X. Li, L. Ren, J. Zhao, Y. Hu, L. Zhang,
G. Fan, J. Xu, X. Gu, Z. Cheng, T. Yu, J. Xia, Y. Wei, W. Wu,
X. Xie, W. Yin, H. Li, M. Liu, Y. Xiao, H. Gao, L. Guo,
J. Xie, G. Wang, R. Jiang, Z. Gao, Q. Jin, J. Wang, and
B. Cao, “Clinical features of patients infected with 2019 novel
coronavirus in Wuhan, China,” Lancet (2020), 10.1016/S0140-
6736(20)30183-5.
[22] J. Riou and C. L. Althaus, “Pattern of early human-to-
human transmission of Wuhan 2019-nCoV,” bioRxiv (2020),
10.1101/2020.01.23.917351.
[23] M. Majumder and K. D. Mandl, “Early Transmissibility Assess-
ment of a Novel Coronavirus in Wuhan, China,” SSRN Elec-
tron. J. (2020), 10.2139/ssrn.3524675.
[24] J Hellewell, S Abbott, A Gimma, NI Bosse, CI Jarvis, TW Rus-
sell, JD Munday, AJ Kucharski, WJ Edmunds, CMMID nCoV
working group, S Funk, and RM Eggo, “Feasibility of control-
ling 2019-ncov outbreaks by isolation of cases and contacts,”
online preprint (2020).
[25] M. E. J. Newman, S. H. Strogatz, and D. J. Watts, “Ran-
dom graphs with arbitrary degree distributions and their appli-
cations,” Phys. Rev. E 64, 026118 (2001).
[26] “WHO disease outbreaks by year: 2019,” https://www.who.
int/csr/don/archive/year/2019/en/ (2019), accessed:
2020-02-09.
[27] Y. Moreno, R. Pastor-Satorras, and A. Vespignani, “Epidemic
outbreaks in complex heterogeneous networks,” Eur. Phys. J. B
26, 521–529 (2002).
[28] V. Colizza and A. Vespignani, “Epidemic modeling in metapop-
ulation systems with heterogeneous coupling pattern: Theory
and simulations,” J. Theor. Biol. 251, 450–467 (2008).
[29] D. J. Watts, R. Muhamad, D. C. Medina, and P. S. Dodds,
“Multiscale, resurgent epidemics in a hierarchical metapopu-
lation model,” Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 102, 11157–11162
(2005).
[30] V. Colizza, A. Barrat, M. Barthe´lemy, and A. Vespignani, “The
role of the airline transportation network in the prediction and
predictability of global epidemics,” Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA
103, 2015–2020 (2006).
[31] A. Wesolowski, T. Qureshi, M. F. Boni, P. R. Sundsøy, M. A.
Johansson, S. B. Rasheed, K. Engø-Monsen, and C. O. Buckee,
“Impact of human mobility on the emergence of dengue epi-
demics in Pakistan,” Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 112, 11887–
11892 (2015).
[32] S. V. Scarpino, A. Allard, and L. He´bert-Dufresne, “The effect
of a prudent adaptive behaviour on disease transmission,” Nat.
Phys. 12, 1042–1046 (2016).
[33] B. M. Althouse and L. He´bert-Dufresne, “Epidemic cycles
driven by host behaviour,” J. R. Soc. Interface 11, 20140575
6(2014).
[34] L. He´bert-Dufresne, P.-A. Noe¨l, V. Marceau, A. Allard, and
L. J. Dube´, “Propagation dynamics on networks featuring com-
plex topologies,” Phys. Rev. E 82, 036115 (2010).
[35] E. M. Volz, J. C. Miller, A. Galvani, and L. Ancel Meyers, “Ef-
fects of Heterogeneous and Clustered Contact Patterns on In-
fectious Disease Dynamics,” PLOS Comput. Biol. 7, e1002042
(2011).
[36] L. He´bert-Dufresne and B. M. Althouse, “Complex dynamics
of synergistic coinfections on realistically clustered networks,”
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 112, 10551–10556 (2015).
[37] L. He´bert-Dufresne, S. V. Scarpino, and J.-G. Young, “Inter-
acting contagions are indistinguishable from social reinforce-
ment,” arXiv (2019), arXiv:1906.01147.
[38] R. S. Dhillon and D. Srikrishna, “When is contact tracing not
enough to stop an outbreak?” Lancet Infect. Dis. 18, 1302–1304
(2018).
[39] D. Klinkenberg, C. Fraser, and H. Heesterbeek, “The Effective-
ness of Contact Tracing in Emerging Epidemics,” PLOS ONE
1, e12 (2006).
[40] G. J. D. Smith, D. Vijaykrishna, J. Bahl, S. J. Lycett,
M. Worobey, O. G. Pybus, S. K. Ma, C. L. Cheung, J. Ragh-
wani, S. Bhatt, J. S. M. Peiris, Y. Guan, and A. Rambaut, “Ori-
gins and evolutionary genomics of the 2009 swine-origin H1N1
influenza A epidemic,” Nature 459, 1122–1125 (2009).
[41] S. K. Gire, A. Goba, K. G. Andersen, R. S. G. Sealfon, D. J.
Park, L. Kanneh, S. Jalloh, M. Momoh, M. Fullah, G. Dudas,
S. Wohl, L. M. Moses, N. L. Yozwiak, S. Winnicki, C. B. Ma-
tranga, C. M. Malboeuf, J. Qu, A. D. Gladden, S. F. Schaffner,
X. Yang, P.-P. Jiang, M. Nekoui, A. Colubri, M. R. Coomber,
M. Fonnie, A. Moigboi, M. Gbakie, F. K. Kamara, V. Tucker,
E. Konuwa, S. Saffa, J. Sellu, A. A. Jalloh, A. Kovoma,
J. Koninga, I. Mustapha, K. Kargbo, M. Foday, M. Yillah,
F. Kanneh, W. Robert, J. L. B. Massally, S. B. Chapman,
J. Bochicchio, C. Murphy, C. Nusbaum, S. Young, B. W. Bir-
ren, D. S. Grant, J. S. Scheiffelin, E. S. Lander, C. Happi, S. M.
Gevao, A. Gnirke, A. Rambaut, R. F. Garry, S. H. Khan, and
P. C. Sabeti, “Genomic surveillance elucidates Ebola virus ori-
gin and transmission during the 2014 outbreak,” Science 345,
1369–1372 (2014).
[42] C. Drosten, D. Muth, V. M. Corman, R. Hussain, M. Al Masri,
W. HajOmar, O. Landt, A. Assiri, I. Eckerle, A. Al Shangiti,
J. A. Al-Tawfiq, A. Albarrak, A. Zumla, A. Rambaut, and
Z. A. Memish, “An Observational, Laboratory-Based Study of
Outbreaks of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus
in Jeddah and Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2014,” Clin.
Infect. Dis. 60, 369–377 (2015).
[43] S. V. Scarpino, A. Iamarino, C. Wells, D. Yamin, M. Ndeffo-
Mbah, N. S. Wenzel, S. J. Fox, T. Nyenswah, F. L. Altice, A. P.
Galvani, L. A. Meyers, and Jeffrey P. Townsend, “Epidemi-
ological and Viral Genomic Sequence Analysis of the 2014
Ebola Outbreak Reveals Clustered Transmission,” Clin. Infect.
Dis. 60, 1079–1082 (2015).
[44] A. Arias, S. J. Watson, D. Asogun, E. A. Tobin, J. Lu, M. V. T.
Phan, U. Jah, R. E. G. Wadoum, L. Meredith, L. Thorne,
S. Caddy, A. Tarawalie, P. Langat, G. Dudas, N. R. Faria,
S. Dellicour, A. Kamara, B. Kargbo, B. O. Kamara, S. Gevao,
D. Cooper, M. Newport, P. Horby, J. Dunning, F. Sahr,
T. Brooks, A. J. H. Simpson, E. Groppelli, G. Liu, N. Mu-
lakken, K. Rhodes, J. Akpablie, Z. Yoti, M. Lamunu, E. Vitto,
P. Otim, C. Owilli, I. Boateng, L. Okoror, E. Omomoh, J. Oy-
akhilome, R. Omiunu, I. Yemisis, D. Adomeh, S. Ehikhiamet-
alor, P. Akhilomen, C. Aire, A. Kurth, N. Cook, J. Baumann,
M. Gabriel, R. Wo¨lfel, A. Di Caro, M. W. Carroll, S. Gu¨nther,
J. Redd, D. Naidoo, O. G. Pybus, A. Rambaut, P. Kellam,
I. Goodfellow, and M. Cotten, “Rapid outbreak sequencing
of Ebola virus in Sierra Leone identifies transmission chains
linked to sporadic cases,” Virus Evol. 2, vew016 (2016).
[45] D. J. Park, G. Dudas, S. Wohl, A. Goba, S. L. M. Whitmer,
K. G. Andersen, R. S. Sealfon, J. T. Ladner, J. R. Kugel-
man, C. B. Matranga, S. M. Winnicki, J. Qu, S. K. Gire,
A. Gladden-Young, S. Jalloh, D. Nosamiefan, N. L. Yozwiak,
L. M. Moses, P.-P. Jiang, A. E. Lin, S. F. Schaffner, B. Bird,
J. Towner, M. Mamoh, M. Gbakie, L. Kanneh, D. Kargbo,
J. L. B. Massally, F. K. Kamara, E. Konuwa, J. Sellu, A. A. Jal-
loh, I. Mustapha, M. Foday, M. Yillah, B. R. Erickson, T. Sealy,
D. Blau, C. Paddock, A. Brault, B. Amman, J. Basile, S. Bear-
den, J. Belser, E. Bergeron, S. Campbell, A. Chakrabarti,
K. Dodd, M. Flint, A. Gibbons, C. Goodman, J. Klena, L. Mc-
Mullan, L. Morgan, B. Russell, J. Salzer, A. Sanchez, D. Wang,
I. Jungreis, C. Tomkins-Tinch, A. Kislyuk, M. F. Lin, S. Chap-
man, B. MacInnis, A. Matthews, J. Bochicchio, L. E. Hensley,
J. H. Kuhn, C. Nusbaum, J. S. Schieffelin, B. W. Birren, M. For-
get, S. T. Nichol, G. F. Palacios, D. Ndiaye, C. Happi, S. M.
Gevao, M. A. Vandi, B. Kargbo, E. C. Holmes, T. Bedford,
A. Gnirke, U. Stro¨her, A. Rambaut, R. F. Garry, and P. C. Sa-
beti, “Ebola Virus Epidemiology, Transmission, and Evolution
during Seven Months in Sierra Leone,” Cell 161, 1516–1526
(2015).
[46] T. Jombart, A. Cori, X. Didelot, S. Cauchemez, C. Fraser, and
N. Ferguson, “Bayesian Reconstruction of Disease Outbreaks
by Combining Epidemiologic and Genomic Data,” PLOS Com-
put. Biol. 10, e1003457 (2014).
[47] F. Campbell, A. Cori, N. Ferguson, and T. Jombart, “Bayesian
inference of transmission chains using timing of symptoms,
pathogen genomes and contact data,” PLOS Comput. Biol. 15,
e1006930 (2019).
[48] E. M. Volz, K. Koelle, and T. Bedford, “Viral Phylodynamics,”
PLOS Comput. Biol. 9, e1002947 (2013).
[49] R. Bouckaert, T. G. Vaughan, J. Barido-Sottani, S. Ducheˆne,
M. Fourment, A. Gavryushkina, J. Heled, G. Jones, D. Ku¨hnert,
N. De Maio, M. Matschiner, F. K. Mendes, N. F. Mu¨ller, H. A.
Ogilvie, L. du Plessis, A. Popinga, A. Rambaut, D. Rasmussen,
I. Siveroni, M. A. Suchard, C.-H. Wu, D. Xie, C. Zhang,
T. Stadler, and A. J. Drummond, “BEAST 2.5: An advanced
software platform for Bayesian evolutionary analysis,” PLOS
Comput. Biol. 15, e1006650 (2019).
[50] T. Stadler, D. Kuhnert, S. Bonhoeffer, and A. J. Drummond,
“Birth-death skyline plot reveals temporal changes of epidemic
spread in HIV and hepatitis C virus (HCV),” Proc. Natl. Acad.
Sci. USA 110, 228–233 (2013).
[51] J. Gardy, N. J. Loman, and A. Rambaut, “Real-time digital
pathogen surveillance — the time is now,” Genome Biol. 16,
155 (2015).
[52] S. Van Puyvelde and S. Argimon, “Sequencing in the time of
Ebola,” Nat. Rev. Microbiol. 17, 5 (2019).
[53] N. D. Grubaugh, J. T. Ladner, P. Lemey, O. G. Pybus, A. Ram-
baut, E. C. Holmes, and K. G. Andersen, “Tracking virus out-
breaks in the twenty-first century,” Nat. Microbiol. 4, 10–19
(2019).
[54] V. J. Munster, M. Koopmans, N. van Doremalen, D. van Riel,
and E. de Wit, “A Novel Coronavirus Emerging in China
— Key Questions for Impact Assessment,” N. Engl. J. Med.
(2020), 10.1056/NEJMp2000929.
[55] N. Imai, A. Cori, I. Dorigatti, M. Baguelin, C. A. Donnelly,
S. Riley, and N. M. Ferguson, “Report 3: Transmissibility of
2019-nCoV,” online preprint (2020).
